Simon South ssouth@slowcomputing.org 2000-2-4 2000 2003 Simon South Verbatim copying and distribution of this material is permitted in any medium, provided this notice is preserved. This essay, written for Professor W. R. Abbott as part of an introductory course in Philosophy, discusses two philosophical arguments regarding the existence of God: one by St. Anselm, who concludes that God must exist; and another by David Hume, who concludes that He must not. Does God exist? This is a question with which man has struggled for thousands of years. The idea of a supreme being governing our existence is central to many of the earth's religions, but the absence of any evidence for or against the existence of such a being has led many people to look beyond religious teachings and apply their own reasoning in an attempt to confirm or deny God's existence. This paper discusses two well-known and opposing arguments presented on the subject by philosophers St. Anselm and David Hume. In his Proslogion, St. Anselm claims to have arrived at a conclusive, all-encompassing proof for the existence of God, whom he defines as that than which no greater can be conceived. The argument proceeds in this manner: assume that things which exist in reality are greater than things which exist solely in our understanding; that is, assume that items which actually exist in our world are greater than those things which can be conceived to exist, but which, in reality, do not exist. Anselm asserts that God can be conceived to exist by any person having been told of His existence, meaning that God, our greatest conceivable being, exists at least in the understanding of people. It then follows from the assumption that God also exists in reality, for if He did not, there could be another being greater than God, namely a being than which no greater can be conceived which exists both in our understanding and in reality. But this contradicts Anselm's definition of God; it follows that God must exist both in our understanding, and in reality. Though persuasive at first read, St. Anselm's argument is built on a number of rather questionable principles. For one, St. Anselm's assumption that things existing only in our understanding are inferior to their counterparts in reality is made without any sort of proof or convincing illustration. In fact, Christian doctrine teaches that human existence is by its nature flawed and mediocre and that inspiration is a gift from God, meaning that St. Anselm could every bit as reasonably propose the opposite resolution: that things existing in reality are inferior to things existing only in our thoughts, which have a divine being as their source. Though steeped in religious dogma, I believe this resolution to be in no way less provable than Anselm's own. Furthermore, if we first assume God to exist based on Anselm's reasoning, we can even use it as a pardoxical statement to prove the nonexistence of God. It is also apparent that St. Anselm fails to draw any correlation between the existence of a greatest conceivable being and the existence of a Christian God, diluting irrevocably what is clearly an effort to justify his own religious beliefs. It is possible that God could exist and yet not be the greatest conceivable being in our universe, despite Christian teachings on the subject. (It is also possible that God could exist as the greatest conceivable being in our universe and yet not be the greatest conceivable being, considering our lack of knowledge on the existence of other universes.) Belief in a supreme being is hardly unique to the Christian religion, and St. Anselm fails to address the other qualities of the Christian God which would identify him to us, among them omnipotency and compassion. Thus, even if we are able to draw the intended conclusion from St. Anselm's reasoning, the information that a greatest conceivable being exists does not necessarily allow us to draw authoritative conclusions regarding our theistic beliefs. David Hume, writing in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, attempts to counter St. Anselm with a simplistic argument of his own. In it, Hume makes two claims: one, that it is impossible to demonstrate something unless its opposite implies a contradiction; and two, that is impossible for something that is distinctly conceivable to imply a contradiction. According to Hume, anything which we can conceive to exist we can just as easily conceive not to exist, and it follows that no being can be proven to exist, including God himself. On this conclusion, he says, is based the validaty of his entire argument. As with Anselm, the well-meaning Hume bases his reasoning on principles that are decidedly unsound: for example, Hume's conclusion that beings can not be proven to exist as their non-existence does not imply a contradiction. This is easily shown to be incorrect. Consider the question, does my self exist? Even though the average individual is, I believe, able to conceive him or herself not to exist, the very act of posing such a question is conclusive proof of his or her own existence—for were he or she not to exist, there would have been no being to pose the question in the first place. Thus Hume's conclusion is readily shown to be untrue, and, by his own admission, the entire argument is rendered meaningless and invalid. In the final analysis, neither Anselm's or Hume's argument can be taken as sufficient proof either for or against the existence of God. Both arguments rely on principles which simply cannot be accepted in the light of further reasoning, and both arguments fail for that reason. As a consequence I am again left to my own devices in attempting to rationalize the idea of a supernatural being and of the religions that support it. Frankly, I doubt that philosophers will ever produce a convincing argument either for or against the existence of God—and if they do, I expect it will be longer and more involved than the short, almost insulting presumptuous arguments posed by Hume and St. Anselm.